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Universal human rights of all are complemented with particular, targeted protection of 
some, especially those that traditionally have been left behind. By juxtaposing the ideas 
of universality and particularity, the article studies vulnerability as a particularising tool 
within human rights with a comparative approach to the influential vulnerability theory 
by Martha Fineman. By outlining the similarities and the differences between the two 
approaches of vulnerability theory and human rights project, the article sheds light on 
how the particular protection needs of persons with disabilities play out in the 
universalistic logic of vulnerability. The article argues that both universal and particular 
obligations of responsive states – and responsive humans – are needed as a way of 
materialising substantive equality for persons with disabilities as vulnerable legal 
subjects. Such obligations cannot be codified in full detail, but the intrinsic essence of 
rights requires each right to be interpreted in context and with regard to the particular 
individual vulnerabilities and resilience of each person. In operationalising the 
obligations arising from such rights, the human rights project and the vulnerability theory 
complement and reinforce each other in terms of specifying the rationale and the detailed 
benchmarks for state action. 
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Introduction 
In recent times, one of the buzzwords in the human rights discourse (and beyond) has been 
‘vulnerability’. The expansion of vulnerability reasoning may be seen as indicative of a trend 
towards particularisation of human rights law, where universal human rights of all are 
complemented with special protection of some, especially those that traditionally have been 
left behind. The adoption of special measures of protection and/or of affirmative action to 
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ensure substantive equality for persons with disabilities is an example of this. Interestingly, 
however, vulnerability as a concept is notoriously absent from the mainstream discussions on 
disability, probably due to the stigma that the notion is perceived to carry and the way it is seen 
to internalise and individualise disability as an ontological factor, thereby contributing to the 
normalisation of the existing power relations within societies (Clough, 2017). 
The situation begs the question of the role and function of the vulnerability paradigm as a 
structural element of human rights in approaching disability. This chapter argues that much of 
this question essentially boils down to the interplay – or the contradiction, as one may put it 
(cf. Petman, 2009: 20)1 – between the universal and the particular in the human rights project. 
By juxtaposing the ideas of particularity and universality, the chapter studies vulnerability as a 
particularising tool within human rights with a comparative approach to the influential 
vulnerability theory by Martha Fineman. By outlining the similarities and the differences 
between the two approaches, the chapter sheds light on how the particular protection needs of 
persons with disabilities play out in the (universalistic) logic of vulnerability. 
This chapter first explores how the human rights project has moved from the view of the human 
as an autonomous liberal subject to a more multifaceted understanding of the legal subject that 
recognises different degrees of autonomy and vulnerability. The way in which international 
human rights law approaches disability is a case in point exemplifying this development. From 
being something that is not really acknowledged at all, disability and impairment have in 
today’s international human rights become to be recognised as factors that specify or 
particularise states’ obligations towards individuals. Against this background, the chapter 
explores how the idea of a ‘responsive state’ has been framed within the two approaches and 
contemplates upon the relationship between the ‘particularity’ of an individual and the struggle 
for universality of resilience-building measures. Universality, it is submitted, does not exclude 
individualisation of the measures. Discussing examples drawn from the experiences of persons 
with disabilities, the chapter reasons that while state obligations are universal of their nature, 
that is, owed to all individuals in the same fashion, targeted special measures are needed to 
ensure the accessibility, adaptability, affordability and availability of societal structures to all 
persons with disabilities. In conclusion, it is submitted that valuable lessons on how to 
understand and address human vulnerability can be learnt both from the more theoretical 
                                                 
1 ‘Within the heart of human rights there lies a tension [ … ]: the tension between homogenization on the 
one hand and respect for pluralism and group difference on the other, between universalism and particularism’.  




framework of the vulnerability theory and the more hands-on approach to vulnerability in 
human rights law. 
Vulnerability and the move away from the idea of the liberal subject 
The changing view of the individual as the subject of law and protection 
A core principle in international human rights law is that of universal application, emphasising 
the fact that human rights belong to everyone; we all hold the same universal rights (e.g. Nifosi-
Sutton, 2017: 28; Arnardóttir, 2009: 42). Historically, such universalism was largely built on 
the idea of the liberal subject capable of claiming his or her rights, the ‘archetype of the 
autonomous, free-standing individual’ (O’Cinneide, 2009: 170). For some time now, however, 
a clear shift in thinking has taken place within human rights law, with a growing realisation 
that whereas rights are universal and the same for everyone, there are groups and individuals 
who face particular challenges in having their human rights realised (cf. Gourevitch, 2009: 
301).2 One such group is persons with disabilities whose human rights have often been denied 
both in law and in practice (Mégret, 2008: 500; Palacios and Walls, 2006: 128). This realisation 
of particular vulnerability has resulted in a shift in thinking through which more targeted 
measures and obligations have been put in place and are seen as a necessary element to the 
universal protection of rights. The resulting struggle for substantive equality through 
affirmative action is characteristic of the human rights project of today. 
Within human rights law, substantive equality is pursued through a multi-lane approach. One 
such lane is to accommodate the special needs of vulnerable groups by interpreting general 
human rights instruments in a way that ensures attention to particular needs. In relation to 
disability, this is something that often has largely remained undone with disability traditionally 
remaining ‘an invisible element of international human rights law’ (Kayess and French, 2008: 
12). Lately, however, various international courts and treaty bodies have started to pay more 
attention to disability and disability has been increasingly included as a topic in general 
comments and reporting regarding general human rights instruments (see, for example, General 
Comment 5, 1994; General Comment 9, 2006; Report, 2007). Through case law, the 
applicability of general human rights instruments to cases involving disability has also been 
clarified. For example, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has adopted an approach 
                                                 
2 Gourevitch argues that there has been a move away from a self-willing moral agent as the foundation 
of rights to a ‘needy individual whose vital interests need protection’.  
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that requires affirmative action from states to ensure substantive equality. 3  Human rights 
treaties may also include provisions that attach specific attention to particular groups. Such a 
provision is, for example, Article 23 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in which the 
States Parties recognise ‘the right of the disabled child to special care’.4 
Notably, special protection for particular groups is also sought for through a number of special 
human rights instruments or ‘thematic conventions’, which have as their aim to address 
particular protection needs and challenge the idea of the liberal subject that is automatically 
and autonomously capable of claiming his or her human rights. An example of such a group-
specific human rights instrument is the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) that was adopted in 2006.5 Given the fact that general human rights instruments, or 
their implementation, do not always fully accommodate the particular needs and experiences 
of some individuals, the special conventions such as the CRPD are seen to have a corrective 
function (Mégret, 2008: 497). ‘These are the afterthoughts, provisions for specific groups of 
people who were not part of the original bargain and whose rights were thus felt, in the years 
to come, to be in need of special protection’, as Petman notes (2009: 24). The CRPD’s aim is 
hence to ensure that human rights are ensured in relation to persons with disabilities through 
‘tailor[ing] the existing suite of general human rights to the specific situation of persons with 
disabilities’ (Quin,, 2009: 100). 
Beside such special conventions and the interpretation of general human rights to the benefit 
of vulnerable individuals, special protection has in human rights law lately increasingly also 
been striven for through the utilisation of the concept of ‘vulnerability’. The augmented use of 
the term in human rights law has sometimes even been seen as a sign of the ‘vulnerabilisation’ 
of the law (Ippolito and Sánchez, 2015: 5).6 An example of this is the rich vulnerability case 
law of the ECtHR, which the Court has developed in particular since the Chapman v the United 
Kingdom case of 2001 recognising that the Roma should be given special protection due to 
their vulnerable position as a minority.7 Since Chapman, the ECtHR has recognised several 
                                                 
3 See, for example, ECHR Factsheet, n.d. The limits of the case law have, however, been 
emphasised by, for example, O’Cinneide, 2009: 180. 
4 There are also many soft law instruments that are group-specific. Regarding persons with disabilities, 
see, for example, Declaration, 1975; Commission, 1998. 
5 Other examples are: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(1979); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990). 
6 Mégret, on his part, speaks of a ‘pluralization trend’, in which specific groups are recognised as 
‘worthy of a specific human rights protection (2008: 495). 
7 Chapman v. the United Kingdom App. no. 27238/95 (ECtHR, 18 January 2001), para. 96. See also 
Peroni and Timmer, 2013: 1063. The word ‘vulnerable’ can, however, be found in some other earlier cases, 




other groups, including persons with disabilities, as particularly vulnerable.8 In Alajos Kiss v 
Hungary, for example, the ECtHR referred to persons with mental disabilities as ‘a particularly 
vulnerable group in society’.9 
It may be argued that the ECtHR’s vulnerability case law functions according to the same logic 
as the special conventions. The underlying rationale for both is that special measures are 
sometimes needed for individuals to enjoy their human rights. Despite the increased focus on 
vulnerability in human rights law, the concept of ‘vulnerability’ has, however, remained rather 
elusive in the law, most notably in terms of its definition (e.g. Peroni and Timmer, 2013: 1064). 
From this perspective, it is interesting that around the same time as the ECtHR’s vulnerability 
case law expanded, Professor Martha Albertson Fineman introduced her influential 
vulnerability theory, first published in 2008 (Fineman, 2008: 1–23). Fineman has herself 
explained the naissance of her theory as an originally a human rights theory for the American 
audience (Fineman, 2013: 13).10 In essence, also the vulnerability theory is a critique of the 
liberal subject as the foundation of law (e.g. Fineman, 2019: 355−6). According to Fineman, 
‘the abstract legal subject of liberal Western democracies fails to reflect the fundamental reality 
of the human condition’ (Fineman, 2017: 133). In lieu of resting on the premise of the liberal 
autonomous individual, she argues, societal design and law should take as their starting point 
an understanding of human vulnerability as something universal and constant (ibid.: 134). In 
the same line of thought as the mechanisms for special protection within the human rights 
project, the theory thus directs criticism against a view of humans as self-sufficient and 
independent (ibid.: 139). Below, the ideas of vulnerability and dependence are explored further 
with an emphasis on vulnerability in the context of disability. 
Changing paradigms of persons with disabilities as vulnerable subjects 
Parallel to the recognition of the fact that special measures are needed to address vulnerability, 
the view on how we comprehend human particularity as such has undergone paradigmatic 
changes. This has happened at several fronts, but an especially interesting example is the 
development that has taken place in how we perceive persons with disabilities as vulnerable 
                                                 
but it was then used in a different context. For example, Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom App. no. 7525/76 
(ECtHR, 22 October 1981). 
8 For example, Alajos Kiss v. Hungary App. no. 38832/06 (ECtHR, 20 May 2010), para. 42; Zehentner v. 
Austria App. no. 20082/02 (ECtHR, 16 July 2009), para. 63; Renolde v. France App. no. 5608/05 (ECtHR, 
16 October 2008), para. 109; and Fernandes de Oliviera v. Portugal App. no. 78103/14 (ECtHR, 31 January 
2019), para. 113. 
9 Alajos Kiss v. Hungary App. no. 38832/06 (ECtHR, 20 May 2010), para. 42. 
10 Later on, Fineman, however, appears to distinguish her theory from human rights law by emphasising 
that the ‘vulnerability approach is not centred on [ … ] human  [ … ] rights’ (Fineman, 2019: 342). 
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subjects of the law. Understanding the global history of disability rights helps us to grasp these 
changes in the conceptualisation of the vulnerability of persons with disabilities over time and 
today. 
For long, disability remained largely an invisible element of human rights law and it was not 
until 1975 that disability entered the mainstream human rights thinking with the Declaration 
on the Rights of Disabled Persons (UNGA, 1975). This was followed in 1982 by the publication 
of the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled People (UNGA, 1982), which 
restated the distinction made between impairment, disability and handicap introduced by the 
World Health Organization in the 1970s.11 This medical model of disability represented a 
medically oriented understanding of disability, under which social disadvantages and 
vulnerabilities were considered to arise as a direct consequence of individual impairment 
(Barnes, 1991: 1−2.). 
This approach to disability was extensively challenged by the disability community for 
individualising disability and victimising persons with disabilities, thereby stigmatising them 
(e.g. Goodley, 2014: 105−30; Grue, 2016: 957−64). It was argued that more than the medical 
‘facts’ were needed in order to understand disability as a collective experience in society, which 
goes beyond the existence or experience of individual persons with disabilities. Out of this 
process emerged a social model of disability, which contests the very assumption of ‘normality’ 
and re-defines disability as a form of social oppression (French, 1994: 3−16). The term 
‘disabled people’ was used to highlight and to politicise the fact that the society and its 
structures created disability. With the social model of disability, it was increasingly realised 
that disability arose from the way societies were organised, not from the individual difference 
or impairment. As a consequence, contextual factors became a more important focus than 
impairments to deconstruct social vulnerabilities and oppressions and the responsibility for the 
collective vulnerabilities of persons with disabilities was shifted to the society at large. This 
approach to the vulnerability of persons with disabilities is inherent also in the CRPD, which 
recognises disability as resulting ‘from the interaction between persons with impairments and 
attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in 
society on an equal basis with others’.12 
                                                 
11 Draft World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, UN Doc. A/37/351/Add. 1, 20 (para. 
6). 
12 Preamble. The incompatibility of the medical model of disability with the CRPD has been emphasised 
by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (see General Comment 6, 2018: paras 2, 8−9). 




The social model shares many of the elements that are also inherent in the theory on 
vulnerability by Fineman. Both of the approaches start from the premise that our understanding 
of vulnerability should transcend the idea of vulnerability as an identity category, to rather see 
it as something that gives rise to obligations upon the state and other actors to accommodate 
such vulnerability and difference. As noted above, for Fineman, vulnerability is something 
constant and universal, following from the fact that humans as embodied beings are 
continuously susceptible to change in their bodily (and social) well-being. That is, there is 
always a possibility for harm, injury and misfortune (e.g. Fineman, 2008: 9).13 In this way, the 
theory deconstructs the able-v. disabled binary (see further, Clough. 2017: 469−81; Knight, 
2013: 15−26), much in line with the social model of disability. 
In Fineman’s theory, a corollary to or consequence of human vulnerability is dependency, of 
which there are two main kinds (Fineman, 2017: 134 and 139). So-called inevitable 
dependency, which, according to Fineman, is universal (Fineman, 2015a: 620), but manifests 
itself in the ‘needs for care associated with certain biological and developmental stages of life’ 
(Fineman, 2017: 139). This type of a ‘physical or emotional dependence on others’ is also, 
according to her, often present in connection to disability (ibid.: 145; Fineman, 2015a: 620). In 
addition to inevitable dependence, Fineman conceptualises derivative dependency, that is, 
‘burdens allocated to some societal roles or positions that operate to disadvantage the 
individuals who occupy them’ and which is socially imposed (Fineman, 2015a:  620−1). The 
theory emphasises that we all experience dependence and lack of autonomy in the different 
phases of our lives. Such dependency should therefore not be regarded as something deviant, 
but as an inevitable aspect of being a human (ibid.: 622). 
While Fineman’s theory strongly focuses on the all-human vulnerability and dependence, it 
also acknowledges difference between individuals. According to Fineman, such difference 
arises as a result of humans being both embodied and social beings embedded in social 
institutions and relationships (Fineman, 2017:  143). As embodied beings, humans experience 
different developmental stages (such as childhood and the becoming of age) and, for example, 
disability (ibid.: 144). As social beings, on the other hand, we are ‘differently situated within 
webs of economic, social, cultural, and institutional relationships that profoundly affect or 
destinies and fortunes’ (ibid.: 145). Interestingly, the factors that result in relevant differences 
between individuals are very similar in Fineman’s theory and in human rights case law. The 
ECtHR has characterised both certain persons as vulnerable (for example, persons with health 
                                                 
13 Scully refers to this as ‘ontological vulnerability’ of all human life (Scully, 2014: 204−5). 
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issues and children),14 and, on the other hand, emphasised that sometimes individuals find 
themselves in vulnerable situations or positions.15 This corresponds to the difference between 
inherent/embodied and situational/embedded vulnerability that often is made with reference to 
Fineman’s theory (see, for example, Mackenzie et al., 2014: 7.16 Regarding the latter, the 
ECtHR has, for example, given legal relevance to historical patterns of discrimination and 
stigma (see, for example, O’Boyle, 2015; Zimmermann, 2015: 540−1), as well as to particular 
situations of dependency.17 As such, also in general human rights law we can see a move 
towards a greater emphasis being put on the societal creation of vulnerability. 
In sum, several shifts in thinking regarding both persons with disabilities as legal subjects, as 
well as the legal subject more in general have taken place over the years in the legal discourse. 
The liberal subject as a basis of laws and policies has at least partly been replaced with a more 
multifaceted understanding of the human condition in which vulnerability and dependence play 
a central role. Simultaneously, a move has taken place towards a greater emphasis on the 
disabling – and abling – contextual factors influencing our resilience and dependence as well 
as disability. With this in mind, a question arises as to what the consequences of such changes 
in our understanding of the legal subject are. How do such shifts affect the way we look at 
obligations incumbent on states in relation to addressing vulnerability of persons with 
disabilities? 
                                                 
14 For example, Rooman v. Belgium App. no. 18052/11 (ECtHR, 31 January 2019), para. 164 (‘the 
applicant is a vulnerable individual on account of his health condition and his detention’). When talking of 
children, it is particularly common to refer to them as vulnerable individuals. For example, in the Popov v. 
France case, the ECtHR emphasised the ‘child’s extreme vulnerability’ that was ‘related in particular to their 
age and lack of independence’. Popov v. France App. no.s 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR, 19 January 2012), 
para. 91. 
15 For example, Kanciał v. Poland App. no. 37023/13 (ECtHR, 23 May 2019), para. 74 (‘all persons 
under the control of the police or a similar authority, are in a situation of vulnerability’), and Mubilanzila 
Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium App. no. 13178/03 (ECtHR, 12 October 2006), para. 55 (‘applicant’s 
position was characterised by her very young age’ which was one of the factors that put her in ‘an extremely 
vulnerable situation’). 
16 Fineman herself, however, maintains that there is only one type of vulnerability that related to our 
embodiment. She thus speaks about embodied and embedded differences (Fineman, 2017: 144; see also 
Fineman, 2015b). A similar point is made by Scully who finds that ‘what have been thought of as special 
vulnerabilities’ in fact can be seen as ‘particular manifestations of a broad ontological vulnerability to do with 
being human’ (Scully, 2014: 218). 
17 For example, Salman v. Turkey App. no. 21986/93 (ECtHR, 27 June 2000), para. 99; Mehmet Ali 
Ayhan and Others v. Turkey App. nos 4536/06 and 53282/07 (ECtHR, 4 June 2019), para. 40; Kanciał v. Poland 
App. no. 37023/13 (ECtHR, 23 May 2019), para. 74; T.W. v. Malta App. no. 25644/94 (ECtHR, 29 April 1999, 
para. 43. Dependency may be due to both situational factors (for example, detention) and inherent factors (for 
example, age) (Zimmermann, 2015: 541). 




The vulnerable subject and the responsive state: the rights-holder–duty-holder 
paradigms 
In the vulnerability theory, the most central consequence of the finding of universal 
vulnerability is the need for an active and responsive state that builds resilience.18 As per the 
vulnerability theory, resilience is ‘what provides an individual with the means and ability to 
recover from harm, setbacks, and the misfortunes that affect our lives’ (Fineman, 2017: 146). 
Societal institutions hold a prominent role in building such resilience and in ‘lessening, 
ameliorating, and compensating for vulnerability’ (Fineman, 2010: 269). Autonomy is possible 
but only with the support by institutions. Societal institutions provide individuals with different 
types of resilience-building assets: physical (e.g. housing and food); human (e.g. education); 
social (e.g. human networks); ecological (e.g. clean natural environment); and existential (e.g. 
religion and art) (ibid.: 270−1). In her theory, Fineman elaborates on how the different types 
of societal organisations and institutions affect human resilience, but state’s role is seen as 
central. ‘Many of the institutions providing resources that give us resilience can only be brought 
into legal existence through state mechanisms’, Fineman notes (ibid.: 272). 
Interestingly, while Fineman emphasises the role played by the state, she does not regard the 
law in the form of individual human/civil rights as central (Fineman, 2019: 342.). More 
specifically, she finds that the identity approach to equality that such legislation represents only 
has ‘a limited view on what should constitute governmental responsibility in regard to social 
justice issues’ (Fineman, 2010: 254). In other words, vulnerability theory rejects the idea of 
human rights as a viable ground for social justice and a responsive state due to its ‘individually 
focused [ … ] agenda that emphasizes formal equality and celebrates individual liberty and 
choice’, which, to Fineman ‘complicates the idea that the state can undertake positive action to 
effect something called social, or collective, justice’ (Fineman, 2019: 346; see also Fineman 
2013: 13). According to the vulnerability theory, one must, instead, go beyond individualised 
rights-based arguments and demand more from societal institutions (Fineman, 2014: 311). 
This position, it is argued, seems, however, to be focused on human rights as individual 
entitlements, and to emphasise the obligation to respect, that is, the obligation of states to 
‘refrain from acting in a way that unjustifiably interferes with [ … ] rights’ (Council of Europe, 
n.d.). At the same time, it appears to discount the flipside of rights, the strong elements of 
positive obligations inherent in each human right, operating not only ex post but most 
                                                 
18 Or to quote Fineman: ‘The nature of human vulnerability forms the basis for a claim that the state must 
be more responsive to that vulnerability’ (2010: 255−6). 
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essentially also ex ante binding societies to take active measures towards the collective 
realisation of all individuals’ rights, both at a universal and at a particular level. 19 At the 
universal level this means, in essence, that states are to contribute to the resilience of 
individuals to resist their vulnerability through the realisation of their human rights. 
While Fineman does not stress the role of rights in creating or upholding a responsive state, in 
the disability context rights hold a prominent role today. The move away from the medical 
approach to disability has meant a shift from a charity-based thinking to a rights-based thinking. 
In terms of law and policy, this means that persons with disabilities are recognised as full 
subjects of rights and as holders of their own rights.20 This is reflected, for instance, in Article 
1 of the CRPD that stipulates that, the aim of the convention is to ‘promote, protect and ensure 
the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by persons with 
disabilities’. In so doing, the CRPD emphasises that persons with disabilities are rights-holders 
whose human rights the signatory states abide to uphold.21 States carry positive and enhanced 
obligations with regard to realising the rights of persons with disabilities through appropriate 
legislative, administrative and other measures, including through amending or abolishing 
legislation or practices that discriminate against them, protecting against discrimination by 
non-state actors, taking measures to facilitate the development of universal design and 
spreading of accessible information and awareness-raising. By emphasising such positive 
obligations, the human rights-based approach to disability not only changed the role of persons 
with disabilities but also that of their counterparts, namely duty-bearers. In the human rights-
based model, duty-bearers are primarily the states that ratify the convention but also many 
others, including anybody involved in inter-personal relationships with persons with 
disabilities.22 
In sum, the role of the state in the human rights system, one may argue, corresponds very much 
with the idea of a responsive state in the vulnerability theory: ‘one with a clear duty to 
                                                 
19 Human rights law fundamentally entails three different types of obligations for states: to respect, to 
protect and to fulfil human rights. What these obligations mean is summarised in the following way by the UN 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: ‘The obligation to respect means that States must refrain 
from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to protect requires States to 
protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses. The obligation to fulfil means that States must take 
positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights’ (Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, n.d.). 
20 General Comment 6, 2018: para. 2. 
21 For example, Kanter, 2007: 292; Quinn, 2009: 89−90. Palacios and Walls have referred to this 
legal development as a ‘paradigm shift’ (2006: 122). 
22 O’Cinneide has noted that the Convention on the Rights of the Child ‘contains similar positive 
obligations which establish individual rights in relationships of dependency’ (2009: 167). 




effectively ensure realistic equality of access and opportunity to society’s resource-generating 
institutions for everyone regardless of their individual characteristics’, as described by Fineman 
(Fineman, 2015a: 613). In this sense, the idea of universal vulnerability requiring a responsive 
state, one could claim, is embedded in the positive human rights obligations that the states have 
abided to under different regional and international human rights treaties. Resilience in the 
human rights language could thus be taken to denote the realisation of rights or the capacity to 
realise one’s rights through a system that builds on an idea of a responsive state. A responsive 
state in human rights terms means that individuals can hold a state to account for its failures to 
abide by its human rights obligations in front of international and regional treaty body organs, 
human rights courts and national supervisory mechanisms. The responsive state as defined in 
the vulnerability theory and the state as a responsible human rights actor vis-à-vis individuals 
may, in other words share more common ground than often thought despite different 
approaches to the significance of individual rights. One could even argue that the differences 
may, in the end, be more in the semantics – in the vocabulary of vulnerability – than in the 
approach to the concept of the responsive state – or the state as a responsible human rights 
duty-holder – at large. In both approaches, social justice is in essence striven for ‘through the 
legal creation and maintenance of just social institutions and relationships’ (Fineman, 2019: 
342; regarding the vulnerability theory). 
From theory to practice: what is expected of the responsive state? 
The vulnerability theory highlights that vulnerability is not something that arises from or at ‘a 
moment of harm or injury’, but that it entails a continuum of changing needs and dependencies 
over the ‘the past, present and future’ (Fineman, 2015a: 626; see also Fineman, 2019: 360−1). 
In Fineman’s theory, this life-course perspective demands that ‘state responsibility with regard 
to human vulnerability must be consistent across the life-course’ (Fineman, 2017: 144.).23 Yet, 
while the theory recognises the changing needs of vulnerable individuals and the constant 
responsibility of the state, it does not go much in detail on what exactly is needed for building 
resilience, remaining on a rather abstract level of meta-level obligations. This is possibly a 
choice that derives from the context in which the vulnerability theory is developed, the 
American society, where a theory to highlight the state as a responsive actor as a counter-
reaction to the American individualism probably has its place. 
                                                 
23 Fineman is critical how parental rights have obscured the independent state responsibility for the well-
being of children, and argues that childhood should not be seen as a period of diminished state responsibility. 
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At the same time, one might argue, when taken from the level of the rationale to the more 
practical level of implementation, within, for example, some of the north-European welfare 
states, the argument of the responsive state may call for some more specificity in order to have 
added operational impact.24 In such contexts, as hinted above, the state is, by and large, (albeit 
often far from perfectly in practice) already assuming the role as a responsive state by 
guaranteeing as constitutional and human rights, assets and resources for universal well-being, 
including universal health coverage, universal free quality primary and secondary education 
available to all and a myriad of social benefits, coupled with proactive measures of 
accommodation to make such rights and benefits equally and effectively available to all on a 
(substantively) equal basis. 
Fineman criticises human rights law for sometimes being ‘abstract’ (Fineman, 2017: 143).25 
This, of course, holds true for many human rights norms. Within human rights law, the often 
abstract rights that can be found in treaties are, however, brought to an operational level through 
the detailed authoritative guidance on their implementation provided not only reactively by 
courts in individual cases but notably also proactively by regional and international treaty body 
organs in the form of general comments and concluding observations issued as a part of their 
monitoring role, as well as in the form of recommendations and orders by national human rights 
monitoring bodies such as the ombudsman system. As a consequence, human rights law 
includes clearly spelled-out obligations for states for accommodated measures towards the 
realisation of rights in the different stages and phases of dependency of the human life, from 
infancy to old age.26 Given the principle of dynamic treaty interpretation,27 such guidance and 
obligations are adapted to the changing realities and circumstances in time and place. 
Through such operationalisation, human rights law has also been forced to address in-depth the 
question of how to approach different degrees and types of human vulnerability and special 
needs. To understand the similarities and the differences between the approaches to 
vulnerability within human rights law and in Fineman’s theory, we therefore need to look more 
deeply into the question of how the two theories approach the question of particularity. 
                                                 
24 Cf. Kohn, 2014: 13 (‘Vulnerability theory provides little guidance as to how to prioritize among 
vulnerable subjects when allocating limited financial resources and political capital. Indeed, it makes such 
differentiation more problematic by emphasizing the universality of vulnerability’). 
25 Fineman is particularly uncomfortable with the human rights focus on liberty and dignity. For 
Fineman, the trigger for state action is the embodied and embedded vulnerability, which, indeed, can be seen as 
a more tangible tenet for why we need a responsive state in general. 
26 Regarding children, see, for example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the various 
general comments adopted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), art. 31. 




Obligations owed to persons with disabilities: vulnerability as a trigger for differentiated 
state action 
Both the vulnerability theory and the human rights project build on the idea of universality. 
We are all equal in dignity and universal rights, postulates the human rights project.28 We are 
all equally and universally vulnerable, suggests the vulnerability theory (for example, 
Fineman, 2017: 142). What both interlinks and differentiates the two schools of thought is, 
however, how they approach differentiation within universality and how this affects the 
measures that states are expected to take to ensure the well-being and dignity of human 
beings. 
Within the vulnerability theory, the approach to universality is unconditional. For Fineman, 
vulnerability presents itself as universal and she rejects the idea that some people can be 
‘considered more or less vulnerable’ or ‘differently or uniquely vulnerable’ (For example, 
Fineman, 2017: 142.).29 Instead, as described above, the theory focuses on how institutions and 
different institutional arrangements can affect and contribute to levels of resilience, to mitigate 
the inherent vulnerability that all individuals share. As Fineman states,  
vulnerability approach is not centered on specific individuals or groups [ … ] Rather, 
addressing human vulnerability calls into focus what we share as human beings, what 
we should expect of the laws and the underlying social structures, and relationships that 
organize society and affect the lives of everyone within society. 
((Fineman, 2019: 342)  
In this way, the theory is based on a post-identity argument that distances itself from ‘a typical 
individualized rights-based argument organized by the concept of impermissible 
discrimination based on identity categories such as sex, race, or ethnicity’ (Fineman, 2014: 
311). 
In the context of human rights, on the other hand, vulnerability is often viewed as something 
particular, or as a continuum where people can be more or less or particularly vulnerable. While 
universality forms the underlying basis also for the human rights thought, the project includes, 
as we have seen above, a set of mechanisms to particularise human rights protection. Such 
                                                 
28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) 
art. 1. 
29 Fineman’s thinking appears to have undergone a slight shift in this regard as in some of her earlier 
writings, particularity was approached differently: ‘While it is important to recognize that vulnerability is [ … ] 
universal [ … ], it is also necessary to simultaneously recognize that vulnerability must be understood as 
particular, varied, and unique at the individual level’ (Fineman, 2015a: 618). 
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mechanisms recognise the need to address the specific measures that are needed for individuals 
to be able to have their rights realised on an effectively equal basis with others. The special 
protection regimes and the concept of vulnerability enhance and specify the scope and content 
of existing obligations to that end. In this way, the particularisation mechanisms can be seen as 
an element of – or indeed, a precondition for – the universality of social justice. They work as 
‘an extraordinary safety mechanism in cases where “regular” protection is not enough to ensure 
the effective realization of rights’ (Heikkilä and Mustaniemi-Laakso, 2019), allowing – and 
obligating – decision makers and judges to ‘show particular vigilance’ when adopting measures 
and assessing possible violations to ensure that the human rights are ensured effectively for 
all.30 
To address such special consideration needs, and gaps in the law, special human rights 
instruments, such as the CRPD, can contain both ‘separate restatements of how rights apply to’ 
the particular groups, but also ‘different versions of the same rights, or possibly even slightly 
different rights’ (Mégret, 2008: 497). 31  More generally, O’Cinneide has argued that: ‘the 
Convention is [ … ] notable for how it articulates and gives effect to a distinctive vision of the 
rights of the individual within society’ (O’Cinneide 2009: 163−4). It, for example, contains a 
set of provisions on protection against violence emphasising that ‘there is a situation of greater 
vulnerability or risk for persons with disability’.32 
Also the ECtHR’s jurisprudence indicates that the special consideration functions on a sliding 
scale basis, with ‘extreme’ or ‘particular’ vulnerability giving rise to enhanced obligations.33 
While it is generally asserted that a finding of vulnerability does not create new human rights 
(e.g. Brandl and Czech, 2015: 253), vulnerability functions as a tool to interpret the existing 
rights in a way that provides the vulnerable individuals protection not only in books but in 
practice. Some authors have even submitted that vulnerability could function as a guiding 
principle when prioritising scarce resources making it possible for states to ‘give preference to 
those whose needs they consider most pressing’ (Peroni and Timmer, 2013: 1084; see also 
                                                 
30 Cf. V.D. and Others v. Russia App. no. 72931/10 (ECtHR, 9 April 2019), para. 115. 
31 When the CRPD was negotiated, an outspoken goal was not to create new ‘disability rights’, but rather 
to ensure that existing rights are fully implemented in relation to persons with disabilities. See, for example, 
Palacios and Walls, 2006; Quinn, 2009: 100. Many scholars have, however, noted that the CRPD at the 
same time has entailed significant changes to existing law. For example, Kayess and French, 2008: 32; 
Mégret, 2008: 498, 503. 
32 Palacios and Walls, 2006: 147. For example, CRPD art. 10, 11, 15−17. 
33 Cf. V.D. and Others v. Russia App. no. 72931/10 (ECtHR, 9 April 2019), para. 115. As pointed out by 
Scully, this requires that one can differentiate ‘normal’ and ‘special’ vulnerability from each other (Scully, 
2014:  204). Human rights law can be criticised for not providing clear criteria for how this differentiation 
should be done. 




Timmer, 2013: 163). In other words, the universality of rights translates into differentiated 
obligations to respond to the different grades and types of vulnerable situations that individuals 
may find themselves in. 
In many cases where the ECtHR has made a finding of particular vulnerability, this has had an 
effect on the outcome of the case (see, however, O’Boyle, 2015: 9). The Court has, for example, 
often found that there is a need to attach ‘special consideration’ or to give ‘special protection’ 
to those identified as vulnerable. To illustrate, in Fernandes de Oliviera v Portugal the Court 
held that:  
Where the authorities decide to place and keep in detention a person suffering from 
[sic] a mental illness, they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing such 
conditions as correspond to the person’s special needs resulting from his or her 
disability.34  
Special measures may thus be necessary for the benefit of members of a vulnerable group to 
ensure equal access to particular rights.35 When adopting policies and legislation, states must 
also pay particular attention to vulnerability, as it may also affect a state’s leeway of action (for 
discussion, see Peroni and Timmer, 2013: 1075−82). As noted in, for example, Alajos Kiss v 
Hungary concerning the denying of voting rights for persons with mental disabilities:  
if a restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group in 
society, who have suffered considerable discrimination in the past [ … ] then the State’s 
margin of appreciation is substantially narrower and it must have very weighty reasons 
for the restrictions in question.36  
Similarly, in Béláné Nagy v Hungary, the vulnerability finding had effects on the 
proportionality evaluation to the effect that the State could not change its system of disability-
related social-security benefits without considering the effects this had on the vulnerable group 
of disabled persons.37 
                                                 
34 Fernandes de Oliviera v. Portugal App. no. 78103/14 (ECtHR, 31 January 2019), para. 113. 
35 For example, Popov v. France App. nos 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR, 19 January 2012), para. 91. 
See also Médecins du Monde – International v. France Complaint No 67/2011 (ECSR, 11 September 2012), 
para. 132. 
36 Alajos Kiss v. Hungary App. no. 38832/06 (ECtHR, 20 May 2010), para. 42. 
37 Béláné Nagy v. Hungary App. no. 53080/13 (ECtHR, 13 December 2016), paras 121−4. 
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The ‘universal’ does not come without ’the particular’ 
In human rights, a finding of vulnerability carries, in other words, legal significance and may 
enhance or specify the obligations on the part of the state to address the special consideration 
needs of the differently vulnerable individuals. This has led some to argue that vulnerable 
persons are ‘entitled to more favorable treatment than others’ (Bossuyt, 2016: 730). This is, of 
course, partly true, but perhaps it would be more correct to say that vulnerable individuals are 
entitled to the same protection as everyone else? The measures that are needed to attain that 
level of protection may just differ from one person to another. Here lies also the main 
difference, we argue, between the formal and substantive conceptions of equality, as will be 
explained more in detail below. 
One of the most eloquent examples of the particularised protection needs is inclusive education. 
Universal access to primary education was included as one of the goals of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (Goal 2, UNGA, 2010). Yet, during and past the time of the 
MDGs, children and persons with disabilities were largely left behind, and the goal of universal 
primary education did not become a reality for children with disabilities. Millions of children 
with disabilities who were not in schools were identified (Groce and Trani, 2009: 1800). This 
was due to the fact that even when children with disabilities were physically integrated in 
schools, the schooling was not inclusive as such. Various particular measures were lacking to 
ensure the accessibility, adaptability, affordability and availability of the education. To attain 
these so-called four As of the right to education, measures such as accessible environment, 
assistive devices and/or support for children with physical disabilities, and sign language-based 
learning and communication possibilities for deaf children may be necessary, among other 
things (General Comment 4, 2016). Children with visual disabilities may need text enlargement 
devices, while children with intellectual disabilities may need easy-read materials and/or 
personalised assistance. Such measures for universal design of the lived-in infrastructures for 
all are a crucial strategy for an inclusive society and require attention to specific needs. These 
measures also form a core of the human rights-based approach to inclusive education (ibid.). 
The right to education is stipulated as a universal right for all children in several widely ratified 
global human rights instruments and the core of this right, access to public educational 
institutions and programmes on an effectively and de facto non-discriminatory basis constitutes 
a right that states are to take all efforts to realise, even in situations of considerable difficulty.38 
                                                 
38 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2015) [report on the protection of 
economic, social and cultural rights in situations of armed conflict, with a specific focus on the rights to health 
and to education], UN Doc. E/2015/59. 




Where such specific measures are not taken, and individuals are treated the same, as formally 
equal to each other, persons with disabilities experience de facto discrimination of their rights, 
as the experience presented below illustrates: 
One day, my housemate in Uganda came home very exhausted. She uses a crutch for 
walking. She said she could not have lunch in her university because the classroom was 
located on the second floor and there was no elevator. It was difficult and took her a 
long time to get to the second floor for the lecture, which continued after the lunch 
break for 30 minutes. With only a 30-minute break, she did not have time to go down 
and find a restaurant, eat, and make it back up to the second floor. So she decided not 
to eat lunch. 
(Katsui, 2009: 141−2) 
When taken from the inter-personal to a societal level, this personal experience highlights the 
element of particularisation that is required for rights protection to be effective and universal 
in the sense that such protection is effectively available to everyone. Such particularisation may 
be done at a universal level through the universal design of ‘products, environments, 
programmes and services’, to make them usable by all people, regardless of whether they have 
a disability or not.39 When diverse needs of individuals are taken into account from the onset 
of the conference and lecture organisation, inclusiveness is in most cases relatively 
unproblematic to arrange (Guzmán et al., 2016: 20). In the example cited above, the event could 
simply have been organised on the first (ground) floor or in another building to be accessible 
for all including those with physical disabilities. At the societal level, such accommodation 
may require special consideration of different special needs, for example, when building, 
renovating and assessing the accessibility of educational environments (General Comment 4, 
2016). 
On the other hand, it is essential to note that individual needs are diverse and cannot be 
accommodated in one solution. Particularisation may, hence, be necessary also at an individual 
level. For instance, some prefer dim light due to their impairment, while others a bright one. 
Persons with disabilities without any intellectual disabilities might prefer self-determination, 
while persons with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities mostly and necessarily rely 
on proxies for making decisions on their behalf (Nieuwenhuijse et al., 2019: 261−71). For blind 
persons the existence of some threshold or different materials may be important in order to 
                                                 
39 CRPD art. 2. 
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distinguish different places. Pedestrian roads can be distinguished from roads for cars by a 
small threshold for them to safely remain on the side of the pedestrian roads. Many wheelchair 
users, on the other hand, prefer not to have any threshold at all, not even a small one, to ease 
their mobility. Moreover, even where a suitable solution may be found to accommodate the 
needs of both wheelchair users and blind persons, the weather conditions during a particular 
day, such as snow, may change their personal needs altogether under the particular 
circumstances. Likewise, while having exactly the same impairments, a subjective right, such 
as the transportation service of a certain number of hours per month for persons with severe 
disabilities, is enough for some and insufficient for others due to personal differences (Adressit, 
2014). These are just some examples among many of heterogeneity of personal needs of 
persons with disabilities vis-à-vis possible solutions. 
Where individual interests collide, universal accessibility and social justice cannot be solved 
by one approach for all. This reality brings in particularisation at an individual level and obliges 
duty-bearers to provide reasonable accommodation, via, as formulated throughout and in 
particular in Article 2 of the CRPD, ‘means necessary and appropriate modification and 
adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular 
case’. Such a human rights-based approach to disability pays attention to both collective and 
individual vulnerabilities of persons with disabilities. Inclusiveness may, in other words, 
require ensuring the protection of rights beyond the universal design. While obligations linked 
to ensuring the universal design of environments, products and programmes so that they are 
usable by all people operates ex ante, that is, proactively, the obligation of reasonable 
accommodation is an ex nunc duty. This means that ‘accessibility must be built into systems 
and processes without regard to the need of a particular person with a disability, for example, 
to have access to a building, a service or a product, on an equal basis with others’ (General 
Comment 6, 2018: para. 24(a)). 
The social model of disability has been criticised for failing to sufficiently take into account 
various individual differences including physical and psychological conditions (Shakespeare, 
2017: 20−1). The same comment, one could argue, may at least partly be relevant for the 
vulnerability theory, which has a strong focus on the universality of vulnerability. Some 
elements of particularisation – albeit in a less outspoken way – figure, however, also in 
connection to the vulnerability theory. Such particularisation takes place in the form of 
particularisation of duties, not of vulnerability as such, unlike in human rights. This is visible, 
for example, in how Fineman approaches differences between individuals resulting from 
societal structures. Addressing such difference is, according to her, vital to underline the role 




of the responsive state in ensuring effective equality of opportunity and equal access to the 
resource-generating institutions for all irrespective of their individual characteristics (Fineman, 
2015a: 612–13). 
The vulnerability theory acknowledges hence that people experience vulnerability differently 
and that people are differently resilient to their vulnerability, which gives rise to differentiated 
obligations on the part of the responsive state. One may even go as far as argue that the different 
levels of resilience in the theory may actually conceptually correspond, at any rate to a certain 
degree, to the different levels of vulnerability in human rights giving rise to different 
obligations. Where the approaches differ, however, as noted above, is in the level of 
particularity in terms of the measures that are expected of the responsive state with regard to 
the operationalisation (similarly Kohn, 2014: 11, 13.). In human rights, such particular 
guidance is provided, for example, through the implementation, monitoring and coordination 
mechanisms stipulated in Article 33 of the CRPD. Interestingly, however, while the 
vulnerability theory at large rejects the group- or identity-based approach to vulnerability, it 
seems that it is open to somewhat of a more targeted approach when it comes to the 
operationalisation of the theory’s tenets, for example, with regard to the elderly (Kohn, 2014: 
11; see also Fineman, 2012: 84). 
Concluding remarks 
The personal story quoted above of the person with disability facing hurdles in accessibility in 
an educational environment is not exceptional and it vividly informs us of the obligations states 
and other duty-holders have in relation to the particular needs of individuals. A principal 
concern arising from such experiences is the attitude of those without a disability towards their 
peers with disabilities, leaving them behind, as if the problem was to be solved by the persons 
with disabilities alone. The peers and stakeholders at the event referred to perhaps did not mean 
to directly discriminate on the basis of disability. Formally equal treatment without paying 
careful attention to particularities, however, was the problem. Three points arise from this 
example and from the above discussion, with a linkage to the particularity–universality 
paradigm that forms the focus of this chapter. All three of them relate, in essence, to how the 
notion of vulnerability can function both to empower and to disempower persons with 
disabilities. 
The first point has to do with how the understanding of vulnerability as universal as opposed 
to particular affects power relations within societies. As outlined above, human rights law 
contains obligations to make ‘products, environments, programmes and services’ usable by all 
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people, regardless of whether they have a disability or not.40 Yet, the practical implementation 
of rights is still often insufficient, something that affects the way persons with disabilities can 
access their rights in practice, even where a relatively solid legal framework is in place ensuring 
equal rights of persons with disabilities. This is often due to the fact that personalisation of 
problems faced by persons with disabilities is still widely practised and remains deeply rooted 
in the mind-set of persons without a disability, hence continuing to sustain the predominant 
tradition of the medical model of disability. The widespread mentality of society is also often 
internalised by persons with disabilities, which further reinforces the normalisation of 
exclusion of persons with disabilities (Katsui, 2005: 84−91). This is a concern that is also raised 
in the recent General Comment to the CRPD on equality, regretting that the persisting 
charity/medical models refrain persons with disabilities from being seen as ‘full subjects of 
rights and as rights holders’ (General Comment 6, 2018: para. 2). 
Fineman’s theory on universal vulnerability holds great potential in addressing this kind of 
attitudinal barriers towards vulnerability and persons with disabilities. When we acknowledge 
that we are all universally and inherently vulnerable, and that we all need special protection in 
different phases of our lives, the stigma of vulnerability is likely to diminish. Through its 
markedly siloed understanding of vulnerability, defining certain groups of individuals as 
vulnerable, rights-based approaches have been criticised for failing to sufficiently recognise 
such lacking structural transformation needed for the empowerment of persons with disabilities 
(see, for example, Katsui, 2012; Katsui et al., 2016: 187−98.). In this light, the vulnerability 
theory is important in further highlighting the significance of a structural approach to 
vulnerability, an approach that starts off not with the characteristics of an individual but with 
the structures, power relations and lived-in-environments in order to identify and to address 
discriminatory elements in them (for example, Fineman, 2019: 367–8). While the CRPD takes 
an important step forward in addressing power relations within societies through its focus not 
only on state–individual but also on inter-personal relationships,41 this development within 
human rights law overall is, however, embryonic. One of the vulnerability theory’s strengths 
is therefore, undoubtedly, its stronger focus on such relationships. 
The second point that arises from the article relates to the operationalisation of the idea of 
universal vulnerability. While Fineman’s vulnerability theory makes a strong case for a 
responsive state, it is not very outspoken as it comes to the specific measures the state should 
                                                 
40 CRPD, art. 2. 
41 CRPD, Preamble (‘Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the 
community to which he or she belongs’) and art. 26(1). 




take to that end. This is probably partly explained by the fact that for Fineman, the focus lies 
in the ‘human’, not the ‘rights’ part of the law (Fineman, 2019: 13). In light of this, the theory 
stresses the need to re-conceptualise the vulnerable human and to more generally change our 
perspective on the role of the state. Within human rights law, on the other hand, the need for a 
responsive state is taken for granted, and the emphasis is more on the realisation of such a state. 
In this context, the individual rights are central as they function as ‘watchdogs’ for the 
responsive state or, in human rights terms, the responsible state. The often-abstract human 
rights found in treaties have through different forms of treaty body practice been developed 
into more concrete state obligations to realise the various human rights, particularising the 
obligations for the reasonable accommodation where needed. Perhaps, in other words, it is 
exactly here where the most fundamental difference in the approach towards the responsive 
state between the human rights school and the vulnerability theory lies: in the level of 
specificity and the particularity of the measures that are expected of the responsive state. In 
this article, it was suggested that such particularity is a key element in the operationalisation of 
an effectively universal approach to vulnerability and rights protection. 
Third, the two schools appear to differ in their approach to individual agency. In the 
vulnerability theory, the emphasis is, as noted above, markedly on the societal power and care 
relationships, which at the same time, seems to a certain degree to overshadow the significance 
attached to the agency of the vulnerable individuals and the need to empower them. According 
to the vulnerability theory, ‘recognition of vulnerability does NOT reflect or assert the absence 
or impossibility of agency’ (Fineman, 2015b). Yet, where persons with disabilities primarily 
are addressed through a caretaker–care receiver paradigm (cf. Fineman, 2017: 139), the voices 
of the persons with disabilities are typically not put in the limelight. Understandably, this 
difference probably is simply a question of focus but is worth pointing out given the importance 
of the issue. Within human rights law the question of agency of all individuals has become vital 
and recognising persons with disabilities as agents of their own rights is seen as crucial (for 
example, Quinn, 2009: 90). The CRPD also opens up alternative ways of conceptualising 
agency, given that persons with disabilities are highly heterogeneous and their vulnerabilities 
are diverse. Some persons with disabilities embrace the expected role of active, independent 
subjects, while for others, such as for persons with profound intellectual and multiple 
disabilities, the realisation of agency, or co-agency with proxies, presupposes careful measures 
and thorough understanding of their needs by the responsive states and responsive humans 
alike. Such differentiation builds, again, on the idea of particularised protection needed for 
substantive equality to be realised. 
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In sum, there are many similarities between the vulnerability theory and the human rights 
approach to vulnerability, but also some significant differences. Both approaches acknowledge 
the duty of the state to respond to the universally shared needs of the individual, although the 
vocabulary to express such needs differs between the two projects. Both of them also recognise 
the importance of the societal structures in addressing human vulnerability and ensuring social 
justice. Based on the above analysis of vulnerabilities of persons with disabilities and the 
comparative analysis of the vulnerability theory and the human rights project, this chapter 
argues that both universal and particular obligations of responsive states are needed as a way 
of materialising substantive equality for persons with disabilities as vulnerable legal subjects. 
Such obligations cannot be codified in full detail, but the intrinsic essence of rights requires 
each right to be interpreted in context and with regard to the particular individual vulnerabilities 
and resilience of each person. In operationalising the obligations arising from such rights, the 
human rights project and the vulnerability theory complement and reinforce each other in terms 
of specifying the rationale and the detailed benchmarks for state action. 
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